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A Household Model of Careers and Education Investment
Abstract
This paper develops a two-stage non-cooperative household game, in which parents make career decisions and
an investment into their child’s human capital. The model is solved for Nash equilibrium outcomes and
extended for a cooperative solution. In non-cooperative pure strategies, both parents choosing to work is a
Nash equilibrium, though there are alternative outcomes when the conditions underlying the career decision
are varied. The investment behaviour of agents is analysed. We find that choices are critically affected by the
magnitude of the cost (and reflected quality) of a high education investment relative to a low investment, and
the intrinsic value that a parent places on the child’s future success. The cooperative game demonstrates
parents maximise their investment in order to provide their child with a high quality education.
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1. Introduction 
 
Household decision-making has been explored for decades, investigating an 
array of recurrent themes; among them, gender, education, marriage, fertility, 
divorce, labour, and domestic violence. We are interested in the conditions 
under which parents in a household will choose to work and said household’s 
optimal investment in the education of children. In this section, the popular 
literature is outlined. We then establish the aims and structure of this paper. 
 
Modelling rational families in limitless environments is considerably abstract. 
Nevertheless, understanding the behaviour of families is important for 
developing policies and appropriate institutions. Simple modelling formulates 
decision-making mechanisms and ideals for society to strive towards in the 
long run. The literature as a whole appears to ratify this view, and illustrates 
many techniques used to model household decisions, from as early as the 
1960s. Due to the theoretical nature of the subject, empirical evidence is found 
but not widely explored. Xu (2007) identifies three prevalent approaches of 
the literature. 
 
Firstly, Nash bargaining models, eminently developed by Manser and Brown 
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). In these models, outcomes are 
always efficient, and there exists a threat point, beyond which the marriage 
between two players will dissolve. Whilst these models have important 
empirical implications, they cannot be easily tested with observable data. 
Choosing an appropriate threat point is particularly difficult in an entirely 
theoretical model, as is identifying the ‘threat’ itself, which is often unrealistic 
and external to the marriage scenario. 
 
Secondly, there are collective models (or Pareto-efficient models), which 
depict the family as a single decision-making unit, rather than a group of 
independent agents. Chiappori (1988a, 1997) characterises these, taking a 
general approach typically with minimal assumptions, to be widely-applicable. 
Consequently, no specific games or decision-making processes within the 
household are specified. Similar to Nash bargaining, the outcomes are 
efficient.  
 
Thirdly, non-cooperative bargaining models have been developed as a result 
of academic dissatisfaction with the limitations of Nash-cooperative models. It 
is important to note that those developed so far are not entirely non-
cooperative; development of this concept still needs to make significant 
progression in order to withstand empirical scrutiny. Parents within the 
household do not enter binding contracts with each other, but instead behave 
as sovereign entities within the household economy. It is important to note that 
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those developed so far are not entirely non-cooperative; development of this 
concept still needs significant progression to withstand empirical scrutiny. 
 
Becker, a clear pioneer in household modelling, typically treats the family as a 
single decision-maker (Becker, 1981), with either homogeneous preferences 
across all members or one all-powerful leader who decides for all. Members of 
a household pool their income, and maximise a household welfare 
collectively. This is disputed by Browning and Chiappori (1998) amongst 
others, who reject income pooling for two-person households. In the context 
of developing countries, where families are often headed by a single male 
earner, perhaps a unitary analogy would be loosely appropriate. However, for 
developed countries, this idea on average is less applicable. After all, women 
comprise an increasing majority of the labour force in OECD countries1. 
 
In conjunction with declining fertility and growing independence of women, 
the unitary approach is increasingly rejected across the literature, notably by 
Thomas (1990). Thomas finds the impact of unearned income differs between 
spouses; for example, income spent by mothers on health and nutrition 
improves the probability of a child surviving by twenty-fold that of 
expenditure by fathers. Thomas’ objection is justified because there is 
incentive for spouses to deviate from operating collectively, and instead 
allocate their individual resources to goods and outcomes they prefer. 
 
Intra-household bargaining begins in the literature in the 1970s and was 
significantly developed by Chiappori (1988b), who vindicated abandoning 
Nash bargaining altogether, and agents making Pareto-efficient decisions 
collectively as a unit. Chen and Woolley (2001) use Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
as the threat point in their bargaining game, and find this yields a Pareto-
inferior result. Due to the extremities in fairness of Pareto efficiency2, it is 
debatable whether this is a strength or a weakness. 
 
Alongside variations in structural approach are the wide variety of issues 
investigated in the literature. Surprisingly popular is the effect of commitment 
on decision making. Rasul (2008) introduces this notion, comparing fertility 
bargaining outcomes in Malaysia with and without commitment. The literature 
examining fertility considers the decision to have children, and how many to 
have. Rasul (2008) also investigates how fertility preferences translate into 
fertility outcomes in a bargaining model, with his utilisation of Malaysian 
household survey data. 
 
                                                 
1
 Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics. 
2
 A resource distribution is Pareto-efficient if no individual can be made better off without 
making another worse off. Thus it is possible for a distribution to be such that one individual 
is allocated everything, and all others nothing. Pareto efficiency therefore does not mean 
equality or fairness. 
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Developing countries are a popular focus of recent literature. There are many 
analyses of nutrition; in particular, expenditure on nutrition, and the nutrition 
of children. Park (2007) explores children’s nutrition and education in 
Indonesia, finding mothers have greater bargaining power over the nutrition of 
children, but that spouses are more equal when deciding upon education 
investment. Basu, Das and Dutta (2007) scrutinise child labour, and find child 
labour in developing countries increases with land wealth until a turning point 
when the relationship reverses. Whilst this paper does not address 
development, the comparisons are useful for interpreting results, and perhaps 
of interest for future study. 
 
There is a small concentration of higher education analyses, with 
concentration on the rates of return to higher education. Welch (2007) 
compares public and private higher education in Indonesia, discussing a 
continued trend towards private higher education institutions. This paper’s 
concern is only with education in the early life of a child, and would maintain 
that early education is more critical than higher education. We would argue 
that early education is an important determinant for the success of a child. 
Higher education is a later step in pursuit of this success, thus the two could be 
better investigated together. 
 
The choice of private versus public school is seldom raised in the literature. 
Rather than being an irrelevant subject for discussion, there are more 
significant factors that are alternatively investigated, such as income, the 
availability of education choices, and the quality of these choices. For 
instance, Dustmann (2004) provides a detailed analysis of school track choice 
in Germany, and how it is primarily influenced by parental background and a 
child’s gender. In Germany, there are few private schools, and those that exist 
are mandated to charge very low fees. As will be shown in this analysis, and 
as one would expect, the relative cost of private to public education is a 
critical determinant of parents’ school choice. Oppositely at a macroeconomic 
level, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) consider public and private education in 
relation to income, and their positive effect on a country’s growth and 
equality. Similarly, Pomponio and Lancy (1986) contrast public education 
investment of developing country governments to investment in private 
education by parents. 
 
Though the impact of a child’s gender on their parents’ expenditure is not 
explored in this paper, it is a common theme across the literature. This has 
important implications for our results, likely to alter the relative importance of 
a child’s welfare in parents’ utilities, dependent upon gender. Echevarria and 
Merlo (1999) find gender differences in education are smaller when 
consumption is included in the utility function, rather than a pure investment 
model, and Bonke and Esping-Andersen (2007) determine male children as an 
important requisite for a father’s time. 
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The impact of divorce on a child’s welfare is not considered here, but has 
interesting connotations for inter-generational income redistribution. Del Boca 
and Flinn (1994) consider divorced parents’ expenditures on children; their 
work is extended by Nunley and Seals (2009), who examine how child 
custody affects investment in children’s private school education. 
 
In order to give real context to this paper, it is useful to consider the empirical 
environment for its application. The issues at hand are parents, their decisions 
to work, and their investment in children. 
 
The perception of men and women in households varies between the 
developed and developing world, and across cultures and societies. It is 
therefore impossible, and arguably inappropriate, to wholly define the 
conventions of each gender, particularly since this paper has not been 
modelled on a particular social group. We can however draw upon prevalent 
observations of adopted gender roles across the demographic literature, in 
order to make practical conclusions. 
 
Oaxaca (1973) argues women’s employment structures differ to those of men 
due to labour market discrimination. Women plan to work less because 
discrimination renders them with lower returns, in the form of lower wages. 
We have not accounted for labour market discrimination, but it is an important 
issue for our results, as this would likely distort women’s incentive to work, 
and thus the career choice of a female spouse. 
 
Fortin (2005) stereotypes women as homemakers and men as breadwinners in 
OECD countries. Although this paper does not explicitly adopt this view, 
differing roles of agents in a household have been accounted for through 
heterogeneity. 
 
This paper looks to explore the choices made by parents in the early life of a 
child; their decisions to work and their individual investments in the child’s 
education, and how this is affected by their resources and preferences over the 
qualities of a child. We develop a multi-stage non-cooperative game with a 
cooperative extension in order to determine the optimal choices for 
heterogeneous spouses. We show the following. In a non-cooperative 
environment, where agents operate independently, it is always optimal for 
both parents to invest highly in the child’s human capital (education). There 
are two attainable career outcomes in pure strategy equilibrium – either both 
parents work, or the parent that prioritises education works, whilst the other 
raises children at home. Our cooperative analysis shows that parents will 
jointly pay for the highest quality education available to maximise the welfare 
of a child.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we formulate the 
model. In section 3, the model is manipulated to demonstrate the existence of 
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Nash equilibrium investment outcomes. In section 4, the analysis and results 
are interpreted and applied to find optimal career paths. In section 5, we 
briefly explore an alternative type of household through a cooperative 
extension. Lastly in section 6, we conclude. 
 
2. The model 
 
There are two players, representative of spouses who have, or who are 
contemplating having, a child. The spouses must choose career paths and this 
decision will impact their level of investment in the human capital of their 
child. We are assuming agents do not communicate, and instead behave 
according to their best responses. 
 
Consider the stage 1 normal form game, Γ1. 
 
  
Player 2 
 
W H 
W NEWW NEWH 
 
Player 1 
H NEHW NEHH 
 
Each player independently makes a career decision; whether to work (W), or 
to not work and stay at home (H). 
 
The stage 2 sub-game ΓC subsequently depends upon the household’s career 
outcome of Γ1. There are four possible combinations and consequently, there 
will be four ΓC sub-games of the combined work decision:  
 
C = {WW WH, HW, HH} 
 
Having made this career choice, player i now independently chooses x i ∈ h, l{ } 
– whether to make a high (x i = h) or low (x i = l) non-negative investment in 
their child’s education. 
 
C  Player 2 
  
H l 
h U i h,h C( )  U i h, l C( )   
Player 1 l U i l,h C( )  U i l, l C( ) 
 
Human capital investment is regarded as a public good, either provided by 
parents or not, and non-rivalrous and non-excludable. The utility parents 
derive from investing in education is not affected by the presence of the other 
investing parent.  
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Players make decisions that maximise their individual payoffs subject to their 
partner’s choice. They derive utility from their individual disposable income 
(y i − x i ), the household’s total investment in education (x = x1 + x2), and some 
intrinsic happiness from the emotional ‘quality’ of their child, e. 
 
Total household investment in education x can be interpreted as the utility a 
parent receives from their child’s ‘output potential’; the success and income 
they will be able to achieve as an adult as a direct manifestation of their 
education. Therefore, parents can contribute to their child’s wellbeing (and 
subsequently, their individual utility) in two ways; by providing them with an 
education and by developing their emotional quality and stability. We assume 
parents can make either of these investments without risk; the child’s fruition 
and therefore the parents’ happiness are guaranteed. 
 
Players are selfish, and do not derive any utility from their partner’s well-
being. This may seem an unrealistic assumption in a marriage situation, where 
we would typically expect spouses to display altruism toward each other3. 
However, it is acceptable for this paper’s purposes; aside from their own, the 
child’s welfare is of primary focus of each player here, rather than that of their 
spouse, who should not be elemental in a human capital investment decision. 
Utility for both players is increasing in their individual investment. For 
simplicity, though common in general household literature, private 
consumption has not been included here in the payoff function.4 
 
The players’ general payoffs are then as follows: 
 
U1 (x1 , x2 C) = y1C − x1 + x 2 + e
= y1
C − x1 + (x1 + x2)2 +
y1
C + y2
C + t2
C
2
U2 (x1 , x2 C) = y2C − x2 +θx + e2
= y2
C − x2 +θ (x1 + x2) +
y1
C + y2
C + t2
C
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
For realism purposes, we assume players have different utility functions. 
Collective unitary models assume homogeneity of preferences across agents, 
thus heterogeneous spouses seem a natural feature for a non-cooperative 
model and are common in the literature. Further reasoning for heterogeneous 
utility functions will be given in section 4.  
 
                                                 
3
 Ermisch (2003) defines altruism in the economic context to describe when an individual’s 
welfare is dependent on the welfare of anfrom the utility of the child. 
4
 Although irrelevant to this investigation, for argument’s sake personal consumption could be 
interpreted as implicit in yi, if yi is defined as income net of private expenditure. 
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It is important to note the payoffs are affected by the career outcome of Γ1, C. 
This affects whether the player earns an income y i and the time spent at home 
by player 2 should they choose to not work t2. For instance, if player i chooses 
to work, y i > 0; if player i chooses not to work, y i = 0. If player 2 chooses to 
work, t2 = 0; if player 2 chooses not to work, t2 > 0. ‘Not working’ could even 
be likened to the maintenance of an undemanding, part-time job. This would 
allow the parent in question to spend sufficient time at home to be emotionally 
beneficial to the child, whilst earning a negligible income that would not affect 
utility. 
 
Weight θ is used in player 2’s utility function to represent heterogeneous 
preferences. θ is the relative value that player 2 places upon the child’s 
education and the subsequent (and guaranteed) success of the child attributed 
to their education. A larger value of θ indicates player 2 believes education is 
an essential driver of success; a smaller value of θ implies that player 2 thinks 
education is a less-significant contributor to success. 
 
The utility component e represents the child’s emotional stability and 
development. It is a function of the household’s income y1 + y2, and the time 
spent at home by parent 2 raising the child should they choose not to work t2. 
e is also a public good. Both parents derive utility from the emotional quality 
of the child; this utility is not affected by the presence of another parent. It is 
reasonable to infer that time spent at home with the child by one parent would 
contribute to their emotional wellbeing. For now, we assume the selection of 
parent 2 is arbitrary.  Furthermore, we assume that players are always able to 
make an investment, regardless of their individual income. Even if a player 
chooses not to work, they are able to find money from some undefined source 
(perhaps savings, parents, inheritance, other assets). Therefore, individual 
investment in the child’s human capital will always be non-negative, x i ≥ 0. 
 
In this paper, the child is not considered explicitly as in other models. Their 
existence and welfare is integrated into the parents’ utility. Young children 
have no decision-making power or skills to enable them to earn an income, 
thus their exclusion as players is without loss of generality. 
 
Given the defined utility functions, the four C sub-games are depicted below. 
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{W,W}    Player 2 
 
h l 
 
 
h 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
l 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y 2
2
,
y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
{W,H}    Player 2 
 
h l 
 
 
h 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + t 2
2
,
−h + 2θh + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
−l + θ (h + l) + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
l 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
−h + θ (h + l) + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
−l + 2θl + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
{H,W}    Player 2  
 
h l 
 
 
h 
−h + 4h 2 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + 2θh +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−h + (h + l)2 + y2
2
,
y1 − l +θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
l 
−l + (h + l)2 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−l + 4l 2 + y2
2
,
y2 − l + 2θl +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
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{H,H}    Player 2 
 
h l 
 
 
h 
−h + 4h 2 + t 2
2
,
−h + 2θh + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−h + (h + l) 2 + t 2
2
,
−l +θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
l 
−l + (h + l)2 + t2
2
,
−h +θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−l + 4l 2 + t2
2
,
−l + 2θl + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
The model is solved by backward induction, first finding a unique Nash 
equilibrium (NE) investment outcome in each ΓC sub-game. Γ1 is then solved 
for the NE career path of the players, taking the previously determined 
equilibrium investment choices as given. 
 
Our first objective is to find a NE education investment outcome in each sub-
game; the sub-game perfect equilibrium of ΓC. 
 
3. Equilibrium investment in education 
 
The aim is to find NE of the players’ career and investment decisions. In order 
to find a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we firstly consider ΓC in its general 
form, where letters A-H represent the payoffs of the players.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For clarity, throughout this paper we assume l = 0, and h > l. Under these 
conditions, we find the NE total level of investment, given career choice C, is 
critically affected by the relative magnitude of h to l, and the value of weight θ 
in player 2’s utility function. The investment outcome of ΓC is determined by h 
and θ. We find that all outcomes can be sustained as pure strategy equilibria 
under different conditions. The conditions ensure that players will not deviate 
from each outcome. 
 
 
Theorem 1.    Assume θ > 1. 
ΓC  Player 2 
  
h l 
h A , B C , D Player 1 
 l E , F G , H 
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(i) When 0 < h < 13 , (l, h) is the unique NE of all sub-games. 
(ii) When h > 13 , (h, h) is the unique NE of all sub-games. 
(iii) When h = 13 , there is no NE in pure strategies. 
 
Proof. 
 
(i) For (l, h) to be a NE in ΓC, it must hold that E > A and F > H. 
 
E > A: 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ h < 13
 
 
F > H: 
y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ θ > 1
 
 
These conditions ensure that (h, h) and (l, l) are not NE. 
 
For (l, h) to be a unique NE in ΓC, (h, l) also cannot be a NE. 
It must hold that G > C or B > D. 
 
G > C: 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ h <1
 
B > D: 
y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ θ > 1
 
 
Given that this has been deduced from the general form of C, we can observe 
these conditions are true for all C. 
 
(ii)  For (h, h) to be a NE in ΓC, it must hold that A > E and B > D.  
 
A > E : 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ h > 13
 
B > D: 
y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ θ > 1
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These conditions ensure that (l, h) and (h, l) are not NE. 
 
For (h, h) to be a unique NE, (l, l) also cannot be a NE. 
It must hold that C > G or F > H. 
 
C > G: 
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ h >1
 
F > H: 
y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ θ > 1
 
 
The condition ‘C > G’ requires that both h > 13  and h > 1. Only ‘C > G’ or ‘F > 
H’ is required to uphold (h, h) as a unique NE in pure strategies. For ease, we 
impose the latter as sufficient; ‘C > G’ is only an additional requirement, and 
can be ignored. 
 
As before, this is true for all C. 
 
(iii) When h = 13 , and θ > 1, a true NE cannot be reached unless player 1 is 
endowed with preferences such that in the event of indifference, he or she 
prefers making one investment over the other. No such preference relation 
has been granted. We can also infer that h = 13  is a (near) zero-probability 
event, as probability is defined on a continuous scale. It is included as a 
proof only to be exhaustive.  
 
 
Theorem 2.    Assume θ < 1. 
(i) When 0 < h <1, (l, l) is a unique NE of all sub-games. 
(ii) When h > 1, (h, l) is a unique NE of all sub-games. 
 
Proof. 
 
(i) For (l, l) to be a NE in ΓC, it must hold that G > C and H > F. 
 
G > C: 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ 1 > h
 
H > F: 
11
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y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ 1 > θ
 
 
These conditions ensure that (h, l) and (l, h) are not NE. 
 
For (l, l) to be a unique NE, (h, h) also cannot be a NE. 
It must hold that E > A or D > B. 
 
E > A: 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ 13 > h
 
 
D > B: 
y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ 1 > θ
 
 
The requirements for (l, l) to be a unique NE specify that h < 1 and h < 13 . Only 
‘E >A’ or ‘D > B’ is required for (l, l) to be a unique NE so, for simplicity, we 
assume the latter. ‘E > A’ is unimportant. 
 
This is true for all C outcomes. 
 
(ii) For (h, l) to be a NE in ΓC, it must hold that C > G and D > B. 
 
C > G: 
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ h >1
 
D > B:
  y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ 1 > θ
 
 
These conditions ensure that (h, h) and (l, l) are not NE. 
 
For (h, l) to be a unique NE, (l, h) also cannot be a NE. 
It must hold that A > E or H > F. 
 
A > E: 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
> y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
⇔ h > 13
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H > F: 
y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇔ 1 > θ
 
This holds for all C.  
 
 
Theorem 3.   When θ = 1, there is no NE in pure strategies. 
 
Proof.  When θ = 1, player 2 will always be indifferent between making 
investments h and l. This result can only be violated if assumptions are made 
about player 2’s preferences over h and l. For example “For player 2, h is 
strictly preferred to l”; therefore when indifferent, player 2 will choose h. As 
no such statements have been made, NE cannot be reached under this 
condition in pure strategies; it is a (near) zero-probability outcome. Its 
inclusion is merely for thoroughness.   
 
 
These findings can be summarised in a scale diagram for investment level h. 
 
 
θ > 1: 
 
 
θ < 1: 
 
 
 
 
All NE investment outcomes are possible under different conditions. The 
implications of these conditions will be realised in the next section. 
 
4. Interpretation and results 
 
The analysis is now explored to offer some palpable and applicable 
explanation. We decipher the investment choices of each player under all 
conditions, and use these to determine under which circumstances it is optimal 
for parents to work or to stay at home. 
 
0 1/3 1 
 
h 
(l, h) (h, h) (h, h) 
0 1/3 1 
 
h 
(l, l) (l, l) (h, l) 
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Remark: So far we have maintained androgyny but it could be argued 
appropriate to identify player 1 as male and player 2 as female by our 
heterogeneous utility functions. Player 2 places greater worth on the emotional 
quality of the child than player 1. Becker (1981) claims that as a consequence 
of a greater biological investment by a mother into a child’s upbringing 
through carrying and nursing, it is natural for her to want to see her investment 
bear fruit. Further, married women traditionally specialise in household and 
child-rearing activities, as they hold comparative advantage in these fields. 
This could be applied to player 2, who has more incentive (utility) to 
maximise the emotional stability and development of the child due to this sunk 
cost. A lower θ could also be interpreted as a reflection of societal customs. 
These are the social conventions that arguably make it easier for women to 
substitute careers for child-bearing activities. Some examples are maternity 
leave, variable work schedules (Flexitime), sympathetic attitudes, and the 
provision of childcare. Nevertheless, this perception is entirely at the 
discretion of the reader. 
 
4.1 Investment choices 
 
It was previously found that each investment combination could be reached as 
pure strategy NE outcomes in the investment sub-games under certain 
conditions. Two types of human capital investment, ‘high’ and ‘low’, have 
been distinguished. This can be likened to parents making a high investment 
and sending a child to a fee-charging private school at significant cost or 
opting for a state-provided ‘free’ education. 
 
It is sensible to assume that the high investment cost of private education is a 
reflection of its quality. The higher h, the better quality of education the child 
will receive. Consequently, parents will derive greater utility from sending a 
child to a private school, everything else constant, as this will contribute more 
to the child’s future success. 
 
Notice that the structure of our game implicitly highlights two categories of 
private school. When one parent invests highly in the child’s education and 
one parent invests low, x = h + l. Assuming l = 0, x = h. The household can 
afford in their investment allocation to education to pay tuition fees and send 
the child to an independent school. Such a school will provide the child with a 
better quality of education than a state school, perhaps due to smaller class 
sizes, highly qualified teaching staff and better facilities. When both parents 
invest highly in education, x = 2h; education expenditure is at its maximum as 
h is unbounded. This is akin to sending a child to an upper-tier private school 
(perhaps an elite public school) that charges even greater fees. This offers a 
significantly better quality of education than a state school, as quality is 
increasing in h. This also incurs substantially higher costs than an independent 
school charging only intermediate fees. Nevertheless, this is in return for a 
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premium education, offering even smaller class sizes, the best teachers and 
world-class facilities. We could even comment that attending an upper-tier 
private school will further cultivate the future success of the child (and thus 
the happiness of the parents) through the greater likelihood of acceptance at 
the best universities, which will enhance their employment prospects. 
 
The alternative to paying intermediate and high fees is paying little (or zero, in 
this case) for a free education provided by the government. This is when both 
parents invest low in the child’s human capital; x = 2l = 0. This may be of 
relatively lower quality, but will be a smaller burden on income, allowing 
parents to derive higher utility from greater disposable income, y i − x i . It could 
be argued that a higher household disposable income will make both parents 
and children better off, through the provision of a stable, comfortable living 
standard. This means there is initially no clear choice between h and l. 
 
The sets of investment choice outcomes, rather than the payoffs, are 
summarised below. This will allow us to interpret the parents’ investment 
behaviour for when θ is greater than and less than 1, under different levels of 
household labour income, and for varying degrees of h. 
 
θ > 1: 
0 < h < 13   Player 2 
 
W H 
W l , h l , h 
 
Player 1 
H l , h l , h 
  
1
3 < h < 1  Player 2 
 
W H 
W h , h h , h 
 
Player 1 
H h , h h , h 
  
h > 1  Player 2 
 
W H 
W h , h h , h 
 
Player 1 
H h , h h , h 
 
When θ > 1, player 2 places greater intrinsic value on the total investment in 
the child’s education. This means that player 2 derives relatively more 
happiness from investing highly in education and from the future success their 
child will be able to achieve as a consequence. Hence a consistently high 
investment made by player 2 – regardless of income, or the cost and quality of 
education – is expected. 
 
In contrast, player 1’s selection is influenced by the price and implied quality 
of the investment. When h is low, a private education is similar in cost and 
quality to a state-provided free education. If this is the case, player 1 invests 
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low – player 1 recognises it is not worthwhile to invest more (however small) 
when a similar outcome can be achieved with less (or nil) investment. Player 1 
only makes a high investment when the difference in calibre between state and 
private education is sufficiently large. 
 
θ < 1: 
0 < h < 13   Player 2 
 W H 
W l , l l , l 
 
Player 1 
H l , l l , l 
 
1
3 < h < 1    Player 2 
 W H 
W l , l l , l 
 
Player 1 
H l , l l , l 
 
h > 1    Player 2 
 W H 
W h , l h , l 
 
Player 1 
H h , l h , l 
 
When θ < 1, player 2 places relatively less weight on the household’s 
investment in the child’s human capital and more on emotional quality. It is 
therefore unsurprising that player 2 systematically chooses to make a low 
(under our assumptions, nil) investment, irrespective of income. 
 
Player 1 also consistently invests at a low level for smaller values of h, 
suggesting as before that player 1 recognises little extra value in a more 
expensive education. However, player 1 now plays ‘Low’ for all values of 
h < 1, compared to ‘Low’ when h < 13 . It seems player 1 is more willing to 
invest when player 2 derives greater happiness from the household’s 
investment. Player 1 only makes a high investment when there is a 
significantly large price and quality discrepancy between private and state 
education. 
 
 
From these observations, we can identify player 2 as more extreme and more 
welfare-centric than player 1, who is financially shrewd and only prepared to 
pay for results.  Player 1’s behaviour is arguably reflected in the payoff 
function, which is strictly increasing in investment. It is interesting to note that 
even though θ is absent from player 1’s payoff function, its value is correlated 
with player 1’s investment. This could imply some dependence mechanism; an 
underlying marital influence of player 2 over player 1. When player 2 favours 
investing either high or low, player 1 is inclined to follow suit. We could also 
surmise that player 2 has high price elasticity of education, as an explanation 
for relatively polar outcomes. Player 2’s investment is highly sensitive to the 
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worth they place on the household’s total investment, at least relative to player 
1. 
 
4.2 Career choices 
 
From the stage 2 NE previously derived, the equilibrium payoffs underlying 
the investment decisions are displayed below, now as elements of the career 
decision game Γ1, for varying values of h and θ. 
 
θ > 1: 
 
0 < h < 13     Player 2 
 
W H 
 
 
W 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
−h + θ (h + l) + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
H 
−l + (h + l)2 + y 2
2
,
y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−l + (h + l)2 + t2
2
,
−h + θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1
3 < h < 1    Player 2 
 
W H 
 
 
W 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + t 2
2
,
−h + 2θh + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
  
 
 
 
 
Player 
1 
 
 
 
H 
−h + 4h 2 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + 2θh +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−h + 4h 2 + t2
2
,
−h + 2θh + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
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h > 1  Player 2 
 
W H 
 
 
W 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + t 2
2
,
−h + 2θh + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
H 
−h + 4h 2 + y2
2
,
y2 − h + 2θh +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−h + 4h 2 + t2
2
,
−h + 2θh + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
θ < 1: 
 
0 < h < 13   Player 2 
 
W H 
 
 
W 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
−l + 2θl + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
H 
−l + 4l 2 + y2
2
,
y2 − l + 2θl +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
−l + 4l 2 + t2
2
,
−l + 2θl + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1
3 < h < 1  Player 2 
 
W H 
 
 
W 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
−l + 2θl + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
H 
−l + 4l 2 + y2
2
,
y2 − l + 2θl +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
−l + 4l 2 + t2
2
,
−l + 2θl + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
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h > 1  Player 2 
 
W H 
 
 
W 
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
−l + θ (h + l) + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
  
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
 
H 
−h + (h + l)2 + y2
2
,
y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
−h + (h + l) 2 + t 2
2
,
−l +θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Theorem 4: {W,W} is a NE, for all h ∉ { 13, 1}, though it is not unique. 
 
To establish the above theorem, we use an accompanying lemma. 
 
Lemma 1.  Assuming income is positive, {W,W} and {W,H} are NE. 
 
Proof. 
Consider the general form of Γ1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the previously defined payoffs, observe that in every scenario, working 
(W) is a strictly dominant strategy for player 1 and, by symmetry, staying at 
home (H) is always strictly dominated. Payoff I is always greater than payoff 
M and payoff K is always greater than payoff O for non-negative incomes. 
 
For player 2, the result is not so clear. Suppose the game is solved by strict 
dominance; we firstly eliminate player 1’s dominated (H) strategy.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For all scenarios, player 2’s payoffs simplify to the following. 
 
                                                 
5
 For strictly dominated strategies, the order of elimination is immaterial. 
Γ1  Player 2 
  
W H 
W I , J K , L Player 1 
 H M , N O , P 
Γ1  Player 2 
  
W H 
Player 1 W I , J K , L 
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If {W,W} is a unique NE, J > L:  y2 + y1 + y22
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
>
y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
If {W,H} is a unique NE, L > J:   y2 + y1 + y22
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
<
y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
If {W,W} and {W,H} are NE, L = J: 6 y2 + y1 + y22
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
=
y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
If we make the blanket assumption that y2 > t2, then {W,W} will be the unique 
NE of Γ1. This is conceivable. Player 2 would draw greater utility from the 
better lifestyle associated with additional household income and the 
improvement in their child’s development attributed to a higher standard of 
living than the utility derived from the contribution to said development that 
time spent at home could make. Unless player 2’s preferences were 
exceptionally altruistic towards the emotional quality of the child, this 
assumption would hold. 
 
However, should an agent have preferences such that they believe time spent 
at home nurturing their children would bring greater benefit than money could 
to both the child’s and their own welfare, it may be that t2 > y2. In this 
instance, player 2 would have incentive to deviate from (W) and {W,H} could 
be reached as a unique pure strategy NE. In these circumstances, it would be 
optimal for player 1 to work and earn the income and education investment 
they so highly value, whilst player 2, our child-carer, stays at home. This event 
would support the aforementioned suggestion of player 2 as a female spouse.  
 
{H,H} and {H,W} could never be reached as pure strategy NE as they would 
require individual income to be negative. This is not feasible in this model 
unless we introduced credit as a means of supplementing income. It is 
irrelevant to this investigation, so non-negative income is strictly maintained. 
 
4.3 Optimal outcomes 
 
{W,W} and {W,H} are the possible pure strategy NE in each possible Γ1 sub-
game. We now investigate under which conditions players’ utility is 
maximised given these career outcomes and our conditional values for h and θ 
in order to ascertain the optimal paths of our players. 
 
                                                 
6
 Assuming player 2 chooses randomly when indifferent. 
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{W,W}: 
 
Comparing payoffs for both players at {W,W} under all six conditions:  
 
For both players, when θ > 1 and h > 1, utility is highest. Players can achieve 
the highest possible happiness when both spouses invest highly in private 
education, and this education is of superior quality to state-provided education. 
We can interpret this as our ideal situation; parents are presented with a choice 
of school types and maximise the future success of their child by providing 
them with the best possible education. 
 
For both players, when θ < 1 and 0 < h < 13 , utility is lowest. Both choose to 
send children to state schools in the knowledge that there is little to be gained 
from investing any higher.  This is the worst possible scenario if both parents 
work. The income earned from working is arguably best spent on providing 
offspring with a quality education. However, in this situation, the range of 
available schooling is limited, thus a high investment would be wasted. Both 
parents work, therefore no time is spent at home by either parent. In the 
context of this model, this is player 2’s prerogative, thus what the child lacks 
in education provision is exacerbated by deficient emotional support. 
 
{W,H}: 
 
Comparing payoffs for both players at {W,H} under all six conditions:  
 
As before for both players, when θ > 1, and h > 1, utility is maximised. Players 
receive the highest possible payoff when both players have high expenditure 
on human capital, and this education is of significantly greater quality relative 
to a free state-provided education. However, in this case, player 2 now stays at 
home and does not earn any income. If we interpret player 2 as female, this is 
consistent with Browning (1992). Although Browning struggles to define an 
exact relationship, he associates the presence of young children in a household 
with lower labour supplied by the mother. Under the assumptions that allow 
{W,H} to be a unique NE, player 2 has preferences that display exceptional 
relative altruism towards the emotional quality of the child (Becker, 1981) 
thus opts to stay at home to cultivate their development. 
 
The worst attainable outcome is as before: when θ < 1 and 0 < h < 13 . The result 
is not so dire. Player 2 is now at home raising the child – what is lacking in 
education is counteracted by the presence of a caring parent. 
 
It is of critical importance to remember that θ and h are determined 
exogenously. Players have no control over their decision-making environment 
and so are susceptible to all {W,W} and {W,H} outcomes. We compare the best 
and worst scenarios simply to evaluate. 
 
21
Young: A Household Model of Careers and Education Investment
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012
  
5. A cooperative extension 
 
We now deviate from the simultaneous decision-making model, where both 
agents are equally weighted, and explore an alternative type of household; a 
cooperative environment, where parents communicate. 
 
In cooperative games, players come together in different coalitions and make 
enforceable contracts. This is in contrast to non-cooperative games, where 
players make decisions independently and the outcomes are self-enforcing. 
We are now concerned with what our theoretical couple can jointly achieve, 
rather than the decisions they can individually make.  
 
In cooperative equilibrium, players 1 and 2 behave as a coalition, and 
maximise the sum of their utilities. In this game, we consider the grand 
coalition, S = 1,2{ }. Rather than selfishly maximising their own happiness, it is 
now in the players’ interest to jointly maximise the welfare of the entire 
household, v(S) =U1 +U2, by choosing the household’s total investment, x = x1 
+ x2. 
 
UMP: 
max
x=x1+x2
v(S) = y1 + y2 − x − x 2 + θx +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 +
y1 + y2 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
∂v(S)
∂x
= −1+ 2x + θ = 0 , ∂
2v(S)
dx 2
= 2 > 0
⇒ x =
1−θ
2
 
 
Observe that this would be the result for all career outcomes, whether either or 
both players worked and earned an income, forgoing time spent at home. Also, 
we have assumed equality of power of spouses. 
 
If θ > 1, x is negative. Given our earlier assumptions, this cannot be (x is non-
negative), therefore it must be that x = 0. This corresponds with our low 
investment outcome, (l, l). The positive second order derivative signals this is 
a minimum. As high investment (h) is unbounded, the maximum can be 
deduced as: 
x ∗ = y1 + y2
⇔ x ∗ = (h,h) = 2h 
 
Cooperative equilibrium is therefore where both players invest highly in their 
child’s human capital, regardless of household income. This is a pleasant 
result. We can interpret the cooperative game as representative of a united 
couple, seeking to make their household as well off as possible together by 
maximising the output potential of their child. This is arguably a more realistic 
scenario than what has been previously assumed; selfish spouses who 
disregard their partner’s happiness. 
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If θ < 1, x is positive. The outcome is still a minimum, and therefore at 
maximum, unbounded h still holds. However, there is a difference. Previously, 
the minimum was at zero (nil investment). The minimum is now a positive 
value, implying a smaller discrepancy in the perceived quality between state 
and private education. This is consistent with our interpretation of θ; when 
θ < 1, player 2 values education less and sees lower worth in an expensive 
private education relative to a free state education. 
 
 
To summarise, in a cooperative environment, parents will consistently spend 
highly to provide their child with a quality education. Although a warming 
result, this behaviour could be interpreted as irrational. If household income is 
low (if neither parent earns an income), investing highly could make both the 
parents and the child worse off. Spending beyond a household’s means could 
erode living standards to a point below a basic sustenance. In order to 
eliminate this possibility, we would need to impose an upper bound on the 
value of h, such that h cannot absorb a fraction of income greater than that 
which would leave the household with less than a moderate quality of life with 
all basic amenities. Any expenditure beyond this would be nonsensical and 
would leave us with a meaningless result. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has developed a two-stage non-cooperative household game, where 
parents decide upon their careers and individual investments into their child’s 
human capital. The model is solved by backward induction for sub-game 
perfect NE to find the optimal paths of both parents. The model is then 
extended for a cooperative equilibrium. 
 
In the non-cooperative environment under pure strategies, both parents 
working is a NE, though there are alternative outcomes when the conditions 
underlying the decision are varied. The investment behaviour of agents is 
critically affected by the magnitude of the cost and quality of a high-cost 
education relative to a low-cost education, and the extent of the intrinsic value 
that player 2 (our implied female spouse) places on education as a driver of the 
child’s future success. Agents are not deterred by high schooling fees as long 
as the price is a reflection of quality. Where a similar standard is attainable by 
free education, parents are more likely to opt for the low-cost alternative. 
 
The cooperative outcome compliments this somewhat; parents will always 
seek to maximise the welfare of their child by providing an education of the 
highest possible quality, irrespective of their income. However, the boundless 
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outcome is troubling and accentuates the need for further development to 
derive a robust theory. 
 
A simplistic model has been constructed and some key issues explored, which 
provide a platform to consider other issues. To truly reflect marriage, we 
require greater interdependence between players. This has been proved 
intermittently in the empirical literature, and would allow us to demonstrate 
the internal dynamics of a household. Also, another tier to the game could be 
introduced. For an example, earlier stages where the parents of our agents 
make career and education investment decisions that alter their preferences. 
 
Roles of men and women in the household have been hinted in this paper but 
there is scope for further investigation. The preferences of agents could be 
experimented with to reflect changing attitudes and perceived stereotypes of 
men and women within and across the world. 
 
We have not considered the possibility of a wage differential between male 
and female spouses. Empirical evidence suggests a significant and robust 
gender-wage gap, such that women earn less than men ceteris paribus. If we 
view player 1 as male and player 2 as female and impose this differential, 
perhaps women would have less incentive to work for lower rewards. They 
would be more inclined to stay at home and maximise their time investment in 
the child’s welfare rather than in education. 
 
No assumptions have been made over the preferences of players for work, 
leisure and home; we have only accepted that work generates income and 
prevents agents caring for children. Introducing further preferences would 
surely affect the career decisions. Following this, we could introduce a trade-
off between x and e; the future output of the child versus their emotional 
quality. There has been no clarification of which is more important, or the 
possibility and effect of a bi-causal relationship. 
 
There is a wealth of interesting comparisons to be made between developed 
and developing countries using this model. 
 
Developing country governments often lack sufficient funds to provide 
widespread free state schools. It is therefore relatively common for parents in 
developing countries to establish independent schools and pay for their 
children’s education (Hillman and Jenkner, 2003). As household incomes in 
developing countries are often much lower than their developed counterparts, 
it would be interesting to test for a potential trade-off between allocating 
income to education and the expenditure required to improve standards of 
living. 
 
It would be interesting to observe if the behaviour of parents changed should 
they have multiple children. Although fertility rates in developing countries 
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are declining, they are still considerably higher than in developed countries7. 
We have theorised that parents have a propensity to invest highly in a quality 
education for a child. It would be interesting to see whether this holds for 
more than one child, and in what functional form education expenditure per 
child increases or decreases. If we assumed heterogeneous children differing 
in their future earning capabilities, perhaps parents would invest more in a 
child with greater potential. Instead, they may compensate a less-able child 
with a better education to eliminate the inequality between children. 
 
The range of unexplored issues highlights this paper as a stepping-stone for 
further investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2010). 
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Appendix 
 
3.  Analysis 
 
Theorem 1 and 2 
 
Testing of all possible NE (h,h) (h,l), (l,h), (l,l) under all C conditions 
is demonstrated, assuming l = 0. 
 
For an investment combination x1 , x2( ) to be a NE, the payoffs must be 
such that neither player has incentive to deviate. 
 
WW: 
 
  Player 2 
  
h l 
 
 
h 
A : y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
B : y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
C : y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
D : y2 − l + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Player 
1 
 
 
l 
E : y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
F : y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
G : y1 − l + 4 l
2 +
y1 + y2
2
,
H : y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
(h,h) 
 For (h,h), to be a NE,  A > E and B > D. 
 A > 
E 
y1 − h + 4h 2 +
y1 + y2
2
> y1 − l + (h + l) 2 +
y1 + y2
2
⇒ −h + 4h 2 > h 2
⇒ 3h 2 > h
⇒ h > 13
 
 B > 
D y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l + θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h + 2θh > θh
⇒θh > h
⇒θ > 1  
 
(h,l) 
 For (h,l) to be a NE,  C > G and D > B. 
 C > 
G 
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
> y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y2
2
⇒ −h + h 2 > 0
⇒ h 2 > h
⇒ h > 1
 
 D > 
B y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − h + 2θh +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒θh > −h + 2θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 >θ  
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(l,h) 
 For (l,h) to be a NE, E > A and F > H. 
 E > 
A 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
> y1 − h + 4h 2 +
y1 + y2
2
⇒ h 2 > −h + 4h 2
⇒ h > 3h 2
⇒ 13 > h
 
 F > 
H y2 − h +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h + θh > 0
⇒θh > h
⇒θ > 1
 
 
(l,l) 
 For (l,l) to be a NE, G > C and H > F. 
 G > 
C 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + y 2
2
> y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + y2
2
⇒ 0 > −h + h 2
⇒ h > h 2
⇒ 1 > h
 
 H > 
F y2 − l + 2θl +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − h +θ (h + l) +
y1 + y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ 0 > −h +θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 >θ
 
 
 
WH: 
 
  Player 2 
  
h l 
 
 
h 
A : y1 − h + 4h
2 +
y1 + t 2
2
,
B : −h + 2θh + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
C : y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
D : −l + θ (h + l) + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
 
 
Player 
1 
 
 
l 
E : y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
,
F : −h + θ (h + l) + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
G : y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + t 2
2
,
H : −l + 2θl + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
(h,h) 
 For (h,h) to be a NE,  A > E and B > D. 
 A > 
E 
y1 − h + 4h 2 +
y1 + t2
2
> y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
⇒ −h + 4h 2 > h 2
⇒ 3h 2 > h
⇒ h > 13
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 B > 
D −h + 2θh +
y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −l +θ (h + l) + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h + 2θh > θh
⇒ θh > h
⇒ θ > 1  
 
 
(h,l) 
 For (h,l) to be a NE,  C > G and D > B. 
 C > 
G 
y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
> y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + t2
2
⇒ −h + h 2 > 0
⇒ h 2 > h
⇒ h > 1
 
 D > 
B −l + θ (h + l) +
y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −h + 2θh + y1 + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ θh > −h + 2θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 >θ  
 
(l,h) 
 For (l,h) to be a NE, E > A and F > H. 
 E > 
A 
y1 − l + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
> y1 − h + 4h 2 +
y1 + t2
2
⇒ h 2 > −h + 4h 2
⇒ h > 3h 2
⇒ 13 > h
 
 F > 
H −h + θ (h + l) +
y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −l + 2θl + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h + θh > 0
⇒ θh > h
⇒ θ > 1
 
 
(l,l) 
 For (l,l) to be a NE, G > C and H > F. 
 G > 
C 
y1 − l + 4l
2 +
y1 + t 2
2
> y1 − h + (h + l)2 +
y1 + t2
2
⇒ 0 > −h + h 2
⇒ h > h 2
⇒ 1 > h
 
 H > 
F −l + 2θl +
y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −h + θ (h + l) + y1 + t 2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ 0 > −h +θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 >θ
 
 
 
HW: 
  Player 2 
  
h l 
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h 
A : −h + 4h 2 + y2
2
,
B : y2 − h + 2θh +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
C :−h + (h + l)2 + y2
2
,
D : y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Player 
1 
 
 
l 
E : −l + (h + l)2 + y 2
2
,
F : y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
G : −l + 4l 2 + y2
2
,
H : y2 − l + 2θl +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
(h,h) 
 For (h,h) to be a NE,  A > E and B > D. 
 A > 
E 
−h + 4h 2 + y2
2
> −l + (h + l)2 + y2
2
⇒ −h + 4h 2 > h 2
⇒ 3h 2 > h
⇒ h > 13
 
 B > 
D y2 − h + 2θh +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h + 2θh > θh
⇒θh > h
⇒θ > 1  
 
(h,l) 
 For (h,l) to be a NE,  C > G and D > B. 
 C > 
G 
−h + (h + l)2 + y 2
2
> −l + 4l 2 + y2
2
⇒ −h + h 2 > 0
⇒ h 2 > h
⇒ h > 1
 
 D > 
B y2 − l +θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − h + 2θh +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒θh > −h + 2θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 >θ  
 
(l,h) 
 For (l,h) to be a NE, E > A and F > H. 
 E > 
A 
−l + (h + l)2 + y2
2
> −h + 4h 2 + y2
2
⇒ h 2 > −h + 4h 2
⇒ h > 3h 2
⇒ 13 > h
 
 F > 
H y2 − h + θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y2 − l + 2θl +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h +θh > 0
⇒ θh > h
⇒ θ > 1
 
 
(l,l) 
 For (l,l) to be a NE, G > C and H > F. 
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 G > 
C 
−l + 4l 2 + y2
2
> − h + (h + l)2 + y2
2
⇒ 0 > −h + h 2
⇒ h > h 2
⇒ 1 > h
 
 H > 
F y2 − l + 2θl +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> y 2 − h +θ (h + l) +
y2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ 0 > −h +θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 >θ
 
 
 
 
 
 
HH 
 
  Player 2 
  
h l 
 
 
h 
A : −h + 4h 2 + t2
2
,
B : −h + 2θh + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
C : −h + (h + l) 2 + t 2
2
,
D : −l + θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Player 
1 
 
 
l 
E : −l + (h + l)2 + t2
2
,
F : −h + θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
G : −l + 4l 2 + t 2
2
,
H : −l + 2θl + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
(h,h) 
 For (h,h) to be a NE,  A > E and B > D. 
 A > 
E 
−h + 4h 2 + t 2
2
> −l + (h + l)2 + t 2
2
⇒ −h + 4h 2 > h 2
⇒ 3h 2 > h
⇒ h > 13
 
 B > 
D −h + 2θh +
t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −l + θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h + 2θh > θh
⇒θh > h
⇒θ > 1  
 
(h,l) 
 For (h,l) to be a NE,  C > G and D > B. 
 C > 
G 
−h + (h + l)2 + t 2
2
> −l + 4l 2 + t2
2
⇒ −h + h 2 > 0
⇒ h 2 > h
⇒ h > 1
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 D > 
B −l +θ (h + l) +
t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −h + 2θh + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒θh > −h + 2θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 > θ  
 
(l,h) 
 For (l,h) to be a NE, E > A and F > H. 
 E > 
A 
−l + (h + l)2 + t2
2
> −h + 4h 2 + t2
2
⇒ h 2 > −h + 4h 2
⇒ h > 3h 2
⇒ 13 > h
 
 F > 
H −h + θ (h + l) +
t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −l + 2θl + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ −h + θh > 0
⇒θh > h
⇒θ > 1
 
 
 
 
(l,l) 
 For (l,l) to be a NE, G > C and H > F. 
 G > 
C 
−l + 4l 2 + t 2
2
> − h + (h + l)2 + t 2
2
⇒ 0 > −h + h 2
⇒ h > h 2
⇒ 1 > h
 
 H > 
F −l + 2θl +
t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
> −h +θ (h + l) + t2
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
⇒ 0 > −h +θh
⇒ h > θh
⇒ 1 >θ
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